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Abstract
Emotional reasoning refers to the use of subjective emotions, rather than objective evidence, to form conclusions about
oneself and the world [1]. Emotional reasoning appears to characterise anxiety disorders. We aimed to determine whether
elevated levels of emotional reasoning also characterise dysphoria. In Study 1, low dysphoric (BDI-II#4; n= 28) and high
dysphoric (BDI-II $14; n= 42) university students were administered an emotional reasoning task relevant for dysphoria. In
Study 2, a larger university sample were administered the same task, with additional self-referent ratings, and were followed
up 8 weeks later. In Study 1, both the low and high dysphoric participants demonstrated emotional reasoning and there
were no significant differences in scores on the emotional reasoning task between the low and high dysphoric groups. In
Study 2, self-referent emotional reasoning interpretations showed small-sized positive correlations with depression
symptoms. Emotional reasoning tendencies were stable across an 8-week interval although not predictive of subsequent
depressive symptoms. Further, anxiety symptoms were independently associated with emotional reasoning and emotional
reasoning was not associated with anxiety sensitivity, alexithymia, or deductive reasoning tendencies. The implications of
these findings are discussed, including the possibility that while all individuals may engage in emotional reasoning, self-
referent emotional reasoning may be associated with increased levels of depressive symptoms.
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Introduction
Prevailing cognitive-behavioural models of mental disorders
emphasise the influence of cognitions (automatic thoughts, beliefs
and interpretations) on emotions. These models only give passing
regard to the possibility that the relationship between cognitions
and emotions may be bidirectional or that emotional states may
influence cognitive content and processes. Beck and Emery [2]
encouraged therapists to discuss with clients how they may be
basing their interpretations on feelings rather than facts (suggesting
an influence of feelings and emotion on cognition) and ‘‘mistaking
feelings for facts’’ has become a standard inclusion in the
‘‘unhelpful thinking habits’’ sections of many cognitive-behaviour-
al therapy (CBT) manuals [3]. However, there is little empirical
research on such processes in clinical disorders.
Whether the emotional and mood states experienced in clinical
disorders influence judgements and interpretations remains an
open question. Arntz et al. [1] investigated whether emotional
reasoning characterises anxiety disorders. Emotional reasoning is
defined as a process whereby subjective emotions, rather than
objective evidence, are used to determine the conclusions that an
individual makes about the external world [4]. In this respect,
emotional reasoning refers to more than a negative appraisal of
oneself or a situation: it instead implies a process of thinking
whereby emotional states are given disproportionate influence in
the formation of an interpretation.
Arntz et al. [1] administered an emotional reasoning task to
four different anxiety disorder groups (panic disorder, spider
phobia, social phobia, and a mixed anxiety disorders group) and to
a non-clinical control group. The emotional reasoning task
involved participants providing ratings of the dangerousness of
scenarios that varied according to whether an anxious response
was or was not indicated.
Arntz et al. [1] found that, in contrast to the control group, each
of the anxiety disorder groups engaged in emotional reasoning.
Most interestingly, the tendency to engage in emotional reasoning
was not restricted to disorder-relevant situations. These findings
have been replicated in a sample of patients with posttraumatic
stress disorder (PTSD) [5]. Furthermore, emotional reasoning has
been associated with levels of anxiety and depression in a non-
clinical child sample [6].
Emotional reasoning has similarities with the concept of anxiety
sensitivity, which refers to beliefs that anxiety experiences have
negative implications [7], and with alexithymia [8]. Arntz and
colleagues [1] have suggested that anxiety sensitivity might lead
individuals to infer danger when they experience anxiety, that
emotional reasoning might cause people to fear anxiety symptoms
(i.e., anxiety sensitivity), or that both anxiety sensitivity and
emotional reasoning may be caused by a third factor. In addition,
the relationship between emotional reasoning and the construct of
alexithymia has not been investigated. Perhaps alexithymic
individuals, who lack a sophisticated understanding of the sources
of emotional experience, may be prone to engaging in emotional
reasoning [8].
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Beyond anxiety, whether or not emotional reasoning tendencies
are associated with depressive symptoms in adults is yet to be
determined. To the extent that clinical levels of anxiety and
depression are characterised by a shared factor of negative
affectivity [9] and frequently co-occur [10], it seems plausible that
individuals with depression, as well as those with anxiety, might
engage in emotional reasoning to a greater extent than those
without. Moreover, findings that ruminating in particular ways
about sad mood can maintain symptoms of depression [11], and
that negative emotions in the context of life stressors might serve to
reactivate depressogenic thinking in previously depressed individ-
uals [12], suggest that emotional reasoning may also be
characteristic of depression.
In anxiety, the most obvious appraisal that might be influenced
by emotional reasoning is the perceived danger of a situation.
Depression however, lacks a single defining appraisal or interpre-
tative style that defines the disorder. For instance, a depressed
person may reason: ‘‘If I’ve failed, I feel sad, so, if I feel sad, I must
have failed’’, but equally that: ‘‘If the situation is hopeless, I feel
despondent, so, if I feel despondent, the situation must be
hopeless’’, or any number of other possibilities.
With this in mind, we hypothesised that high dysphoric
individuals would engage in emotional reasoning to a greater
extent than would low dysphoric individuals. We expected that
emotional reasoning in dysphoric individuals might be charac-
terised by any of a number of interpretations, but especially those
pertaining to how worthless and incompetent one is, as well as how
hopeless the situation is. An additional goal of Study 1 was to
determine the independence of emotional reasoning from anxiety
sensitivity and alexithymia, respectively.
Materials and Methods
Participants
Seventy first year psychology students (mean age = 19.09;
SD= 2.14; 42 [60%] female), who received course credit for their
participation were divided into low dysphoric (BDI-II#4) and high
dysphoric (BDI-II $14) groups on the basis of their BDI-II scores.
The lower cut-off of 4 for the BDI-II was chosen as this has been
used in previous studies [13]. We opted for an upper cut-off of 14
on the basis that it corresponds to ‘‘mild depression’’ according to
the BDI-II manual. Participants who scored in mid-range of BDI-
II scores were excluded and participated in an alternative study.
Ethics Statement
All participants were 17 years or older and provided informed
written consent to participate in the study. The study was
approved by the University of New South Wales Human Research
Ethics Advisory Panel C (Behavioural; File no. 889).
Self-report Measures
The following self-report measures were presented in rando-
mised order to reduce the possibility of order effects:
The Anxiety Sensitivity Index (ASI) [7] is a widely-used 16-item
self-report scale assessing the fear of anxiety-related symptoms.
The Beck Depression Inventory II (BDI-II) [14] is a widely-used
21-item self-report scale that assesses symptoms of depression.
The Dysfunctional Attitude Scale – Form A (DAS) [15] was
used to assess beliefs that are considered to contribute to cognitive
vulnerability to depression [16].
The 20-item Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS) [17] was used to
evaluate difficulties in emotional awareness and understanding.
Emotional Reasoning Task
Following completion of the self-report questionnaires, partic-
ipants were administered the emotional reasoning task. The
experimental task of Arntz et al. [1] was adapted for the present
study. Arntz et al.’s procedure has been used in numerous studies
of both children [18] and adults [5]. For the purpose of the present
study, we developed seven scenarios that were designed to be
relevant for the student sample. The themes of the scenarios
included friendships, world events, exams, relationships and other
social situations. These were presented to participants on
computer. Six of these were dysphoria-relevant and one was the
panic attack themed anxiety-relevant scenario as reported in the
Arntz et al. [1] paper. We included this anxiety scenario used by
Arntz et al. to allow a partial replication of their study and to
determine whether dysphoric individuals engage in emotional
reasoning when experiencing fear.
Emotional Reasoning Task Instructions
Each participant was asked to imagine themselves in the
situation described in each scenario which was presented with four
separate endings: one objectively neutral and with a non-valanced
emotional response, one objectively neutral with a dysphoric (or
anxious) emotional response, one with an objectively negative
ending and non-valenced emotional response, and one with an
objectively negative ending with a dysphoric (or anxious)
emotional response (See Text S1, for an example).
Item Validation
To ensure that our scenarios were relevant to depression and
dysphoria, we surveyed psychologists (n=8), clinical psychologists
(n=14) and psychiatrists (n=2) who had been practising for an
average of 9.29 years (SD=7.96, range 0 to 26 years).
Respondents were asked to rate the valence (from negative [25]
to neutral [0] to positive [5] on an 11 point rating scale) of each
emotion-based statement from each item (e.g., ‘‘You feel sad’’).
They were then asked to provide a rating of how characteristic
they believed that each statement was of a person who has a
clinical depression (i.e., the sort of thought or feeling that a
depressed person would be likely to report during a clinical
assessment; 0 = ‘‘Not at all characteristic’’ to 10= ‘‘Extremely
characteristic’’). When each of the means for the valence ratings
were put in rank order, each of the neutral valence script-ending
statements had a more positive valence rating than each of the
negative script-ending statements. Likewise, for the ratings of how
characteristic each statement was of clinical depression, each of the
negative script statements were rated as more characteristic of
depression than each of the neutral scripts.
Emotional Reasoning Task Ratings
Following the administration of each script, participants were
asked to provide the following ratings for each scenario on a 0 to
100 visual analogue scale:
1. How unfortunate is this situation?
2. How negative is this situation?
3. How worthless does this situation suggest that you are?
4. How incompetent does this situation suggest that you are?
5. How hopeless is the situation?
6. How controllable is the situation?
Mean scores for the two self-referent ratings (i.e., how worthless
and incompetent the situation suggests that one is), were based on
Emotional Reasoning and Dysphoric Mood
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only three of the scenarios that were considered relevant for these
ratings.
However, for the anxiety relevant scenario, the same ratings as
provided in the Arntz et al. [1] study were used (how dangerous is
the situation, how safe is the situation, how controllable is the
situation, how unpleasant is the situation, and how good is this
outcome). Arntz et al. reported that aside from the perceived
dangerousness ratings, their other four ratings were included only
as ‘‘filler’’ items (p. 920). We therefore limit our discussion to
perceived dangerousness so far as the anxiety-related item is
concerned, so as to allow comparison with the findings of Arntz
et al.
Participants were presented with each of the scenario endings in
one of eight pseudo-random orders such that no two endings from
the sample scenario were presented consecutively (to reduce any
carry-over effects).
Data Analysis
All analyses were conducted using the Statistical Package for
Social Sciences (SPSS 17.0). We compared demographic and self-
report questionnaire scores using t-tests (for continuous variables)
and chi-square tests (for categorical variables). We used the False
Discovery Rate method [19] to control the Type 1 error rate in
instances where multiple comparisons were made.
We calculated emotional reasoning (difference) scores as
outlined by Engelhard et al. [5]. This involved subtracting the
mean ratings of each scenario that involved an emotionally neutral
response from the mean ratings of each situation that included an
emotionally valenced response. We averaged these difference
scores across the objectively neutral and objectively negative script
endings to ensure that emotional reasoning scores were not
confounded by the objective nature of the situation.
Results
The high dysphoric group comprised 42 participants and the
low dysphoric group 28 participants. Table 1 summarises the
demographic characteristics and self-report scores for the sample.
There were no significant differences in emotional reasoning
scores between each of the eight different orders of presentation of
the emotional reasoning task (all ps ..05), suggesting that there
were no order of presentation effects. The emotional reasoning
scores for each rating within each of the low and high dysphoric
groups were in almost all cases significantly greater than zero,
suggesting that individuals within both the high and low dysphoric
groups engaged in emotional reasoning (the means and standard
deviations for each item of the emotional reasoning task are
available from the authors on request). The exception was for
ratings of controllability which were not significantly greater than
zero for either the high or low dysphoric groups.
Figure 1 shows the emotional reasoning scores in the high and
low dysphoria groups. Between-group differences in mean
emotional reasoning scores did not reach statistical significance
after applying the False Discovery Rate for multiple comparisons.
Ratings of how incompetent one was in each situation approached
significance (t=2.27, df=1, 68, p= .03; ns after applying the False
Discovery Rate). We repeated these analyses after excluding one of
the scenarios that referred to feeling ‘‘worthless and hopeless’’ as
these were also ratings that participants provided for each of the
situations. When we did this, the pattern of results was the same.
So far as the anxiety-related rating was concerned, the between-
group difference in mean emotional reasoning scores was not
significant.
There were no significant correlations between emotional
reasoning and scores on any of the self-report measure scores
indicating that emotional reasoning scores were independent of
dysfunctional attitudes, anxiety sensitivity, and alexithymic
tendencies (see Table 2).
Discussion
The findings of this study indicated that both the low and high
dysphoric groups engaged in emotional reasoning, as evidenced by
more negative ratings for the scenarios that indicated a negative
emotional response. However, with few exceptions, scores on the
emotional reasoning task were not significantly greater for the high
dysphoric group than the low dysphoric group. It is noteworthy
Table 1. Demographic variables and self-report questionnaire scores for the low dysphoric, high dysphoric and total sample in
Study 1.
Low dysphoric (n=28) High dysphoric (n=42) Total sample (N=70)
Comparing proportion of
females in Low vs High
dysphoric groups
n % n % N % x2 p-value
Females 14 50.00 28 66.67 42 60.00 1.94 0.16
95% Confidence Interval for
Low vs High dysphoric
groups
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD t p-value
Age 18.82 1.22 19.26 2.58 19.09 2.14 0.84 0.40
Self-report questionnaires:
ASI 16.29 9.79 27.02 11.64 22.73 12.09 4.02 ,0.0001
DAS (A) 104.82 20.50 140.81 32.52 126.41 33.29 5.20 ,0.0001
TAS – Total score 41.07 8.58 55.26 11.38 49.59 12.44 25.61 ,0.0001
ASI = Anxiety Sensitivity Index; DAS (A) =Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale – Form A; TAS = Toronto Alexithymia Scale.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0067359.t001
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that one of the self-referent ratings - incompetence - approached
significance (p..05 after controlling for multiple comparisons).
It is also noteworthy that there was no significant difference
between the high and low dysphoric groups for the dangerousness
rating for the anxiety-themed script. Although Arntz et al. [1]
found that emotional reasoning was a transdiagnostic tendency, in
that each of their different anxiety-disorder groups demonstrated
emotional reasoning, our findings suggest that dysphoric individ-
uals do not engage in emotional reasoning in anxiety-themed
situations. Admittedly, our high dysphoric group may have been
below the threshold for a clinical disorder, and this might account
for our non-significant findings. We also administered only one of
Arntz et al.’s four emotional reasoning items, so a more extensive
replication of their findings is needed.
Emotional reasoning scores were also independent of scores on
the measures of dysfunctional attitudes, anxiety sensitivity and
alexithymic tendencies. To the extent that the scenarios procedure
used in our study was a valid measure of emotional reasoning, the
absence of these associations in our data indicates that emotional
reasoning may be a separate construct and that our findings may
not have been confounded by participants with high levels of each
these tendencies.
These findings could be extended in several ways. First, the
inclusion of additional self-referent ratings for each scenario would
allow us to be more confident that there is indeed a tendency for
self-referent ratings, as opposed to other ratings, to be especially
influenced by mood in high dysphoric participants. Second, the
procedure used in this initial study did not allow us to determine
whether emotional reasoning tendencies might simply be account-
ed for by more general deficits in deductive reasoning, rather than
a style of reasoning that is specific to emotional states. Third, the
predictive value of emotional reasoning across time could not be
ascertained from our results. In this regard, emotional reasoning
tendencies might have value for predicting subsequent depressive
symptoms. We aimed to address each of these limitations in our
second study.
Study 2
Recent conceptualisations of cognitive processes in depression
have placed an emphasis on negative self-referent interpretations
as particularly characteristic of the disorder. For instance, negative
views of the world and the future in depression may be limited to
one’s own self and future [20], helplessness theories of depression
highlight internal attributions and self-blame in depression [21],
the response-styles theory focuses on internal self-analysis of the
causes of depression [22], and diagnostic criteria place importance
on one’s feelings of worthlessness (DSM-IV) [23].
Given the apparent importance of such self-referent interpre-
tations in depression, we therefore decided to include relatively
more self-referent ratings in this second study (i.e., ratings of how
pathetic and inadequate participants would consider themselves to
be in the given situation, as well as ratings of perceived
Figure 1. Emotional reasoning scores for high and low dysphoric groups in Study 1. Error bars are the standard error of the mean. No
between group differences remained significant at p,0.05 after applying the False Discovery Rate for multiple comparisons.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0067359.g001
Table 2. Correlations between emotional reasoning scoresa
for the dysphoria items and self-report measures in Study 1.
Emotional reasoning
rating DAS (A) ASI TAS – Total score
Low dysphoric (n= 28)
Unfortunate 0.03 20.08 0.13
Negative 0.17 20.08 0.13
Worthless 0.36 20.03 0.03
Incompetent 0.30 20.15 0.08
Hopeless 0.03 20.10 0.22
Controllable 0.20 0.50 0.17
High dysphoric (n= 42)
Unfortunate 20.32 20.19 20.22
Negative 20.15 20.18 20.27
Worthless 20.07 20.07 20.13
Incompetent 20.01 20.03 20.09
Hopeless 20.30 20.23 20.24
Controllable 0.30 0.15 0.20
No correlations were significant after applying the False Discovery Rate.
DAS (A) =Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale – Form A; ASI =Anxiety Sensitivity
Index; TAS = Toronto Alexithymia Scale.
aEmotional reasoning scores were calculated by subtracting ratings for
situations without a negative emotional response from ratings for situations
with a negative emotional response.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0067359.t002
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worthlessness and incompetence). For the purpose of replication of
our results from Study 1, we retained two non-self referent ratings:
the degree to which participants perceived the situation as
unfortunate and the degree to which the situation was interpreted
as negative.
We also extended the previous study by including a deductive
reasoning task and by re-assessing participants 8 weeks later. By
including the reasoning task, we hoped to confirm that emotional
reasoning tendencies are independent of deductive reasoning
ability. In addition, the re-assessment of participants 8 weeks later
allowed us to determine whether emotional reasoning predicts
subsequent depressive symptoms. Prospective relationships have
not been previously investigated in an adult sample. A previous
study of children and adolescents however, found that emotional
reasoning predicted subsequent anxiety symptoms [24].
Eligibility for Study 1 had been determined on the basis of BDI-
II scores. However, for this second study we recruited participants
regardless of BDI-II score. Thus, the sample comprised the full
spectrum of BDI-II scores. This allowed us to 1). conduct analyses
using BDI-II scores as a continuous variable and 2). replicate the
analyses of Study 1 by dividing the sample into high and low
dysphoric groups (BDI-II#4 [low dysphoric]; BDI-II $14 [high
dysphoric]).
Further, in Study 2 we assessed participants’ levels of anxiety
symptoms. Given the frequent co-occurrence of anxiety and
depressive symptoms, we measured anxiety in order to control for
these symptoms and thus rule out the possibility that any
differences in emotional reasoning that emerged between high
and low dysphoric individuals were merely a consequence of
anxiety symptoms (i.e., given the findings of Arntz et al. [1]).
For Study 2 then, we aimed to determine whether depressive
symptom scores are correlated with emotional reasoning tenden-
cies. In this respect, we hypothesised that there would be
significant positive correlations between BDI-II scores and
emotional reasoning scores, particularly for the self-referent
emotional reasoning ratings (i.e., worthless, incompetent, pathetic
and inadequate) that we expected might be especially character-
istic of depression.
We also aimed to replicate and extend the findings of Study 1.
Our second hypothesis was that, consistent with the findings of
Study 1, emotional reasoning scores would be significantly greater
than zero. We also hypothesised that, with a larger sample and
additional self-referent ratings, the high dysphoric group would
score significantly higher on the emotional reasoning task than the
low dysphoric group for the self-referent emotional reasoning
ratings. In an extension of Study 1, we also assessed current
anxiety symptoms to allow greater confidence that any differences
in emotional reasoning scores between high and low dysphoric
participants were not an artefact of differences associated with
anxiety symptoms. Our fourth hypothesis was that the high
anxiety symptoms group would score significantly greater on the
emotional reasoning task than the low anxiety symptoms group,
consistent with Arntz et al.’s [1] findings that clinical levels of
anxiety are associated with greater levels of emotional reasoning,
regardless of the context in which emotional reasoning may arise
(e.g., in panic-related, social anxiety-related, or in this case,
dysphoria-related situations). Fifth, we hypothesised that emotion-
al reasoning scores would be independent of deductive reasoning
abilities. Sixth, we hypothesised that scores on the emotional
reasoning task would be stable across an 8 week interval, consistent
with previous notions that emotional reasoning may be a trait-like
tendency [1]. Finally, given that emotional reasoning tendencies
have been associated with subsequent anxiety symptoms in
children and adolescents, we hypothesised that scores on the




Participants were 118 first year psychology students (91 females;
77.1 percent; mean age = 19.79, SD=4.94) who participated in
exchange for course credit.
The mean interval from baseline to the second session was 7.80
weeks (Median= 8.00, SD=0.93). The follow-up interval of 8
weeks was chosen for practical reasons in that participants could
be re-assessed within the same semester of their course so as to
reduce the rate of attrition. Of the 118 participants who completed
the baseline assessment, 106 (89.8%) also completed the second
session. Data regarding the reasons for not participating in the
second session were not systematically collected, although it was
noted that a number of those who did not wish to attend the
second session had already earned their necessary research
participation credit for the semester and so were not interested
in attending the second session. Importantly, participants who did
and did not complete the second session did not differ statistically
in demographic characteristics or self-report scores. Participants
who did not attend the follow-up scored more highly on baseline
emotional reasoning pertaining to how ‘‘pathetic’’ situations
suggested that they were (t=2.30, df=116, p= .02) but were
otherwise equivalent on other baseline emotional reasoning
ratings.
Ethics Statement
All participants were 17 years or older and provided written
informed consent to participate in the study. The study was
approved by the University of New South Wales Human Research
Ethics Advisory Committee Panel C (Behavioural; File no. 1056).
Self-report Measures
The Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI), BDI-II and DAS were
administered at the baseline assessment and the BAI and BDI-II
were administered at the second assessment.
The BDI-II and DAS are described in Study 1. The BAI [25] is
a widely used 21-item self-report scale that assesses common
features of anxiety, such as nervousness, a fear of losing control,
and somatic aspects of anxiety.
Procedure
For Study 2 we decided to replace four scenarios that did not
seem likely to give rise to self-referent emotional reasoning with
four additional new ones that did (available from the authors on
request). We repeated the same item validation process as in Study
1 and this again confirmed the valence and relevance of each item
for depression. Participants were asked to provide ratings for how
unfortunate and negative each respective situation was, as well as
how worthless, incompetent, pathetic and inadequate each
situation suggested that they were, with the latter four ratings
considered to be ‘‘self-referent’’.
For the anxiety related scenario, the dangerousness rating was
again used.
To ensure that emotional reasoning tendencies are not simply
an artefact of a more general deductive reasoning deficit, we also
administered a modified version of the Wason Selection Task
(WST) [26]. The task was modified so that the hypothetical
situations had local and age appropriate relevance (e.g., establish-
ing whether one hour of study each night will necessarily lead one
to receive a distinction in one’s psychology course). Each
Emotional Reasoning and Dysphoric Mood
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participant was instructed to select the minimum number of (four)
‘‘cards’’ (on a computer screen) to ‘‘turn over’’ to disconfirm the
stated rule, with each card indicating either whether the
antecedent had occurred (or not) or whether the consequence
had occurred (or not). For instance, for the study related item, the
correct response would be to ‘‘turn over’’ the cards ‘‘Did study for
an hour each night’’ and ‘‘Did not receive a distinction’’. The task
generates scores for verification and falsification, as well as a total
score (higher scores indicating better deductive reasoning ability).
Follow-up
At the second session, the above procedure was repeated except
that the WST was not readministered.
Data Analysis
To allow replication of the findings from Study 1, we divided
the sample into high (BDI-II $14; n=34) and low (BDI-II#4;
n=20) dysphoric groups based on the BDI-II. Although not a
focus of the present study, we also divided the sample into high
(BAI $16) and low (BAI#7) anxiety groups, based on their scores
on the BAI [27]. These thresholds were chosen because the
manual of the BAI [27] describes scores of 7 or less as indicative of
a ‘‘minimal’’ level of anxiety and scores of 16 and above as
reflecting a ‘‘moderate to severe’’ level of anxiety.
As in Study 1, we calculated emotional reasoning difference
scores in a similar manner to Engelhard et al. [5]. Emotional
reasoning scores were then correlated with scores on other self-
report measures at the initial and second assessments.
Given that the sample was not restricted according to BDI-II
scores, as was the case in Study 1, we also conducted correlation
analyses between emotional reasoning scores and other relevant
variables (for instance, BDI-II and BAI). So far as the predictive
value of emotional reasoning scores was concerned, we also
correlated emotional reasoning scores at baseline with emotional
reasoning scores at follow-up, and conducted partial correlations
between emotional reasoning scores at baseline and BDI-II scores
at follow-up, controlling for baseline BDI-II scores.
Results
There were no differences in emotional reasoning scores
according to order of presentation, except for the anxiety related
scenario of perceived dangerousness (F=3.39, df=7, 98, p= .003).
Baseline
The correlations between the self-report measures (BAI, BDI-II,
and DAS) and emotional reasoning scores at baseline and follow-
up are reported in the upper and lower sections of Table 3,
respectively. At baseline, three of the four self-referent emotional
reasoning ratings (i.e., incompetent, pathetic, and inadequate)
were positively and significantly associated with BDI-II scores,
although the associations were typically only small to medium in
size in most cases. Thus, the first hypothesis was partially
supported. Each of the self-referent emotional reasoning scores
was also negatively correlated with DAS scores, suggesting that
greater levels of self-referent emotional reasoning were associated
with more dysfunctional attitudes.
We then divided participants into high and low dysphoric
groups based on their BDI-II scores at the first session (henceforth
referred to as ‘‘baseline’’). Consistent with our second hypothesis,
participants in both groups appeared to engage in emotional
reasoning (in that their emotional reasoning scores were in each
case significantly greater than zero, the exception being for ratings
of safety in the high dysphoric group). The means of each of the
depression-related emotional reasoning scores for the high
dysphoric group were greater than for the low dysphoric group,
although these differences did not reach statistical significance (see
Figure 2). For the anxiety-related emotional reasoning items, the
low dysphoric group scored higher than the high dysphoric group
for the dangerousness rating.
The mean of each of the depression-related emotional reasoning
scenarios was significantly greater for the high anxiety symptoms
group than for the low anxiety symptoms group for ratings of
‘‘pathetic’’ and ‘‘inadequate’’ (partially supporting our fourth
hypothesis; see Figure 3). There were no differences between the
low and high anxiety symptoms groups for the anxiety-related
scenario.
There was overlap in the composition of the high dysphoric and
high anxiety symptoms groups, such that high BDI-II scorers also
tended to score high on the BAI, and low BDI-II scorers tended to
also score low on the BAI (x2 = 24.07, df = 1, p,0.001). To ensure
that emotional reasoning differences between the high and low
dysphoric groups were not a result of anxiety rather than
Table 3. Correlations between emotional reasoning scoresa
and BDI-II, BAI and DAS scores at the baseline and follow-up




BDI-II BAI DASb Mean (SD)
Unfortunate .16 .07 2.01 30.81 (14.60)
Negative .12 2.02 .04 34.12 (16.41)
Worthless .18 .11 2.25* 19.41 (16.41)
Incompetent .23* .17 2.23* 18.35 (15.20)
Pathetic .26* .16 2.31* 16.84 (15.14)
Inadequate .33* .21 2.33* 16.84 (13.55)
Emotional reasoning anxiety score:
Dangerous 2.06 .01 .03 9.80 (23.13)






Unfortunate 0.06 20.04 30.46 (16.73)
Negative 0.13 20.03 32.28 (16.80)
Worthless 0.15 0.06 21.34 (18.86)
Incompetent 0.20 0.09 20.96 (17.63)
Pathetic 0.24 0.08 18.20 (17.19)
Inadequate 0.18 0.02 18.22 (15.91)
Emotional reasoning anxiety score:
Dangerous 0.03 0.09 13.06 (24.11)
Mean (SD) 11.25 (8.59) 9.86 (9.44)
BAI = Beck Anxiety Inventory; BDI-II = Beck Depression Inventory – II;
DAS=Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale Form A.
*Significant at p,0.05 after applying the False Discovery Rate.
aEmotional reasoning scores were calculated by subtracting ratings for
situations without a negative emotional response from ratings for situations
with a negative emotional response.
bThe dysfunctional attitudes scale – form A (DAS-A) was not administered at the
follow-up assessment. Negative correlations indicate a positive association
between dysfunctional attitudes and emotional reasoning scores.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0067359.t003
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depressive symptoms, we therefore conducted post-hoc partial
correlation analyses to determine whether the association between
BDI-II and emotional reasoning scores remained after controlling
for BAI scores. None of these partial correlations were greater than
60.10 or were statistically significant.
So far as the WST is concerned, all correlations between
emotional reasoning scores and each of the WST scores (for
verification, falsification and WST total score) at baseline were less
than.25 and only two were significant. These were for the
association between WST falsification scores and emotional
reasoning scores for pathetic (r= .20, p,.05) and inadequate
(r= .24, p,.01), respectively. Thus, our fifth hypothesis was not
supported.
Follow-up
Each of the emotional reasoning scores at baseline was
significantly correlated with their respective score at follow-up (rs
ranging .53 to .74). The correlations between baseline and follow-
up emotional reasoning scores for the perceived dangerousness of
the anxiety scenario was .21 which was not significant after
applying the False Discovery Rate.
Partial correlations between (i) emotional reasoning scores at the
initial assessment and (ii) BDI-II and BAI scores at follow-up,
controlling for the baseline BDI-II and BAI score respectively,
were each small in magnitude and none of them reached statistical
significance.
General Discussion
The findings of these two studies suggest that most individuals,
even those who do not meet criteria for a mental disorder, engage
in emotional reasoning. This is consistent with our first hypothesis
in Study 2. In this respect, our findings are discrepant from those
of Arntz et al. [1] but concordant with those reported by
Engelhard et al. [5]. It is noteworthy, however, that even in the
Arntz et al. study there was a trend for non-anxious participants to
engage in emotional reasoning, as evidenced by non-significantly
greater danger ratings when an anxious script ending was
Figure 2. Emotional reasoning scores for the high and low dysphoric groups at baseline in Study 2. Error bars are the standard error of
the mean. No between group differences were significant at p,0.05.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0067359.g002
Figure 3. Emotional reasoning scores for the high and low anxiety symptoms groups at baseline in Study 2. Error bars are the standard
error of the mean. *Between group differences were significant at p,0.05 after controlling for multiple comparisons.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0067359.g003
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included. Together, these findings suggest that emotional reason-
ing may characterise all individuals to a greater or lesser extent.
The central hypothesis of each of our studies was that scores on
the emotional reasoning task would be associated with greater
levels of depressive symptoms. When comparing the low and high
dysphoric groups in Studies 1 and 2, the direction of the between
group differences was in the predicted direction in almost every
case (the exception being ratings of ‘‘negative’’ for the high versus
low anxiety symptoms comparison in Study 2), although the
differences did not reach statistical significance after corrections
for multiple comparisons. The high within-group variability for
each of the high and low dysphoric groups may explain the lack of
significant differences. It is remarkable, however, that the between
group differences of the greatest magnitude were for self-referent
items (i.e., incompetent and worthless in Study 1, and pathetic and
inadequate in Study 2). When we conducted a more sensitive
correlation analysis (i.e., which included continuous rather than
categorical variables) of the Study 2 data at baseline, scores on
three of the four self-referent emotional reasoning ratings were
significantly correlated with depressive symptoms. At the follow-up
assessment, these associations did not reach statistical significance,
but were still of similar (small-sized) magnitude. Our findings
therefore provide partial support for the second hypothesis of
Study 2, in that scores for self-referent emotional reasoning may be
especially likely to be elevated among participants with high levels
of depressive symptoms.
We included the panic disorder-relevant scenario from Arntz
et al. [1] in each of our studies to determine whether our samples
would engage in emotional reasoning in anxiety-provoking
situations as well as in dysphoria-relevant situations. In contrast
to the findings of Arntz et al., the scores of our participants on this
item did not suggest that they were engaging in anxiety-related
emotional reasoning. This may be due to the fact that neither of
our university-student samples were comprised of predominantly
clinical participants unlike in the Arntz et al. study. Further
replication is therefore needed, especially given that we included
only the panic disorder-relevant script of Arntz et al., and not the
two that were tailored for other disorders (i.e., social anxiety
disorder and specific phobia), or their non-specific ‘‘control’’
script.
Aside from establishing whether participants with high and low
levels of depressive symptoms respond differently to anxiety-
related situations, our second study also investigated whether
individuals with high levels of anxiety symptoms had greater
dysphoria-relevant emotional reasoning scores than those with low
levels of anxiety symptoms. Interestingly, two of the four self-
referent emotional reasoning ratings (pathetic and inadequate)
were significantly elevated in the high anxiety symptoms group,
despite the thematic similarities between these items and
depression or low self-esteem, rather than anxiety. This raises
the possibility that some of the associations between emotional
reasoning and depression could be accounted for by co-occurring
anxiety symptoms. However, when we conducted a partial
correlation analysis between emotional reasoning scores and
depressive symptoms, controlling for anxiety symptoms, the
magnitude of the correlations between emotional reasoning scores
and depressive symptoms was only marginally reduced. This
provides preliminary evidence to suggest that associations between
emotional reasoning and depressive symptoms are not simply an
artefact of the overlap between depressive and anxiety symptoms.
The results of Study 1 allow increased confidence that
emotional reasoning is not simply a reflection of high levels of
anxiety sensitivity. Likewise, the lack of a significant association
between emotional reasoning and alexithymia scores indicate that
emotional reasoning was independent of participants’ ability to
recognise and understand emotions. Perhaps individuals with high
levels of emotional reasoning are able to recognise and understand
their emotions effectively, but place an inflated importance on the
implications of such emotions. Finally, consistent with our fifth
hypothesis from Study 2, emotional reasoning scores were
independent of deductive reasoning ability, the small-sized
associations between falsification scores and ratings of pathetic
and inadequate notwithstanding. To the extent that falsification
scores may correspond to an ability to disconfirm assumptions, this
ability may help to protect individuals who are prone to self-
referent emotional reasoning from experiencing more severe
depressive symptoms if they are otherwise able to seek exceptions
to a negative interpretation of their mood states. We acknowledge
that this account is merely speculative at this stage.
Consistent with suggestions by other researchers that emotional
reasoning might be a trait-like tendency [1], we found that scores
on the emotional reasoning task were consistent across the 8-week
follow-up interval (Study 2, hypothesis 5). Given the seemingly
complex developmental trajectories of emotional reasoning during
childhood [24,28], the findings of the present study indicate that,
at least by early adulthood, emotional reasoning tendencies might
be relatively entrenched.
There were no significant correlations between emotional
reasoning scores at baseline and depressive symptom scores at
follow-up, controlling for baseline levels of depressive symptoms.
Thus, the seventh hypothesis of Study 2 was not supported.
Subsequent anxiety symptoms were also not predicted by
emotional reasoning scores. This raises the possibility that
emotional reasoning tendencies may not portend either the
recurrence or persistence of depressive (or anxiety) symptoms.
One possibility is that emotional reasoning may contribute to the
initial occurrence of depressive symptoms, and that other factors,
for instance, withdrawal from rewarding activities, may play a part
in the persistence or recurrence of such symptoms.
One interesting possibility to consider is that it may not
necessarily be the case that emotional reasoning is an unhelpful
tendency in all situations. The aforementioned finding that even
participants with low levels of depressive and anxiety symptoms
demonstrated emotional reasoning difference scores of greater
than zero suggests that emotional reasoning in and of itself may
not be a sign of psychopathology. There may be situations where
one’s emotional state provides important and helpful information
for the situation at hand, and research by social psychologists has
emphasised the potentially adaptive function of allowing one’s
emotional and affective state to guide cognitive processing [29].
One possibility is that it may instead be the degree of emotional
reasoning or the extent to which an individual’s emotional state
information impedes the processing of other important informa-
tion about the situation which puts the individual at risk for
increased depressive or anxiety symptoms.
There are numerous limitations of the studies reported here.
First, we relied on student samples. Replication of these results in a
clinical sample would allow hypotheses about the relationship
between emotional reasoning and clinical depression to be tested.
Second, these two studies were only able to investigate associa-
tions, and whether there is a causal precedence of emotional
reasoning or depressive symptoms over the other remains unclear.
Still, our preliminary prospective findings suggest that scores on
the emotional reasoning task may not necessarily predict
subsequent depressive symptoms. On the other hand, it remains
possible that elevated levels of anxiety or depressive symptoms put
an individual at risk of increased emotional reasoning. Third,
perhaps the most noteworthy limitation of the present studies was
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that the script-based emotional reasoning procedure that we
employed, although used in numerous previous studies, has not
previously been systematically validated. Thus, the construct
validity of the task remains to be verified and we acknowledge that
there is a lack of ecological validity in that participants were
required to imagine themselves feeling certain emotions in
particular situations [30]. Other studies have used ambiguous
biofeedback procedures to investigate anxiety-based emotional
reasoning [31], however, the lack of well validated procedures for
measuring depression-relevant emotional reasoning in the pub-
lished literature calls for the development of additional experi-
mental procedures and self-report methods.
In summary, our two studies suggest that there may be small-
sized associations between emotional reasoning and depressive
symptoms. This association appears to be independent of anxiety
symptoms. Emotional reasoning appears most pronounced when
individuals make self-referent interpretations of situations. Al-
though emotional reasoning appears to be a stable tendency, there
remains uncertainty regarding the prospective value of emotional
reasoning in predicting depressive symptoms. With further
validation of emotional reasoning measures as well as replication
of these findings using clinical samples and alternative emotional
reasoning procedures, the links between emotional reasoning and
depression may be better understood.
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